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Viewing cable 04ANKARA2341, TURKEY'S WAY FORWARD ON CYPRUS

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- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
04ANKARA2341	2004-04-26 13:51	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Ankara

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.tanea.gr>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002341

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2014

TAGS: [CY](#) [GR](#) [PREL](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: TURKEY'S WAY FORWARD ON CYPRUS

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Despite the wake of the GCs' "no," we need to move toward an eventual GC "yes" to the Burgenstock agreement. On the Turkish side, we should help Ankara preserve the its delicate balance for Cyprus settlement; encourage the Erdogan government to continue its "one step ahead" policy; reach out to Turkish Cypriots; and engage the EU. End Summary.

Help Preserve the Balance in Ankara

2. (C) The Erdogan government and the MFA pieced together a tenuous Cyprus balance with the military, the President, the bureaucracy and Parliament that enabled them to move forward for the past four months. The possibility of receiving a date in December to begin EU accession negotiations may help preserve the balance over the next few months. However, this balance is not locked in: it remains precarious and subject to the vagaries of Turkish politics.

3. (C) We must work preemptively to help maintain the balance in Ankara. In the event the GCs ever bring themselves to endorse the basic terms of the Annan Plan, a settlement will still require Turkish Parliament's and President Sezer's formal approval. While the military has no formal role, it still wields enough behind-the-scenes power to scuttle an agreement.

4. (C) Progress in two key areas will help maintain the balance:

-- Primary law: We should work with the UK to gain more specific guarantees that the terms of an ultimate settlement will become primary EU law. This will help meet President Sezer's and the military's principal reservations and dampen the effect of domestic political critics.

-- TCs' situation: We must act on our promise to ameliorate the TCs' situation (more below). This will strengthen the hand of pro-solution forces in the Turkish government and bureaucracy, allowing them to point to "progress" on the island stemming from Turkey's pro-settlement orientation.

Encourage Turkey to Continue "One Step Ahead"

15. (C) Erdogan's Cyprus mantra has been to stay "one step ahead" of the GCs. This has played well domestically and in Europe. We should encourage its explicit continuation. We expect the GOT to push back, arguing Turkey's efforts and TC referendum approval already put it one step ahead and now it is the GCs' turn. Still, many Turks worry that, come December, the EU will have forgotten Turkey's achievements. We can effectively use this argument to urge continued steps ahead, albeit small ones. In doing so, we need to be careful not to cross the line that would fuel expectations of re-opening negotiations; the specter of new negotiations will unravel Ankara's support for the agreement.

16. (C) For starters, we should again raise the idea of easing passport requirements for GCs. Although Ziyal told us on April 20 this will not happen, "TRNC Interior Minister" Murat told Nicosia DCM on April 22 that discussion on this were still ongoing. We can also press the Turks to complete unfinished technical work on the agreement.

Speak Promptly, Act Concretely To Help Turkish Cypriots

17. (C) We need to speak out promptly and then act concretely on our promises not to leave TCs out in the cold. While the EU reaction is key, we cannot be seen in Ankara to be merely the tail on an EU dog. We should begin by announcing specific steps the U.S. plans to take, followed by their gradual implementation. This will have the twin salutary effects of helping maintain Ankara's pro-settlement stance and demonstrating to GCs the cost of a continued "no." At the same time, keeping in mind that the ultimate goal is a united Cyprus, we should take great care not to raise Turkish expectations of a divided island. Some steps should include honoring "TRNC" export documentation; helping TCs gain economic assistance, including from the IMF, World Bank and EU; opening TDA and ExIm operations to the Turkish Cypriots, particularly in the tourism sector; removing the ban on direct travel by USG officials to Cyprus via the north; offering technical assistance to build rule of law and to combat money laundering; ending restrictions on flights to the north; a visit to Washington by Talat; upgrading the status of the "TRNC's" representation in Washington.

Engage the EU

18. (C) The goal of getting a date to begin EU accession negotiations remains an effective, largely-accepted external discipline in Ankara. We should encourage the EU to explicitly recognize Turkey's positive efforts on Cyprus in the months leading up to December. This will reassure Turkey its efforts have not been in vain and will help pro-settlement forces hold the line in Ankara. We should raise the idea of opening some channel for TCs to express themselves within the EU. While staying out of technical details, we should keep reminding the EU of the importance of working to give Turkey the primary law guarantees it needs to keep President Sezer and the military on board.
EDELMAN